Privacy Preserving Data Publishing addresses the problem of publishing the data collected from data owners by the data holder or publisher such that personal sensitive information of the individual is preserved and the published data is highly useful. The anonymization techniques such as Generalization, Suppression, Swapping, Bucketization and Randomization suffers from either individual identity disclosure or the significant loss in information which reduces the usefulness of the data. In this paper, we present a novel Privacy Preserving Data Publishing scheme based on tuple duplication. We introduce the notion of Semantically Equivalent Attribute Values for sensitive attributes and Reputation Loss by Disclosure to hide the sensitive information of an individual in the published data. The Trapdoor Attribute Values for sensitive attributes are defined which helps in recovering the original dataset from the published dataset. We evaluate the proposed scheme with the existing attack models and show that our scheme counters those attacks. We define our own privacy criterion and show that the published data achieves the same. We assess the utility of the published data by using the existing utility metrics and our own defined utility metric. We show that the utility of the published data using the proposed sanitization mechanism is high.
Introduction
Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) provides methods and tools for publishing useful information while preserving data privacy (Chen, Kifer, LeFevre & Machanavajjhala 2009 ). PPDP is required as there can be serious consequences if the owner (or publisher) of the data publishes the data without taking care about the protection of the sensitive information. There are several instances that demonstrates the problem. (Sweeney 2002) identified the insufficient privacy protection of a medical dataset. About 87 percent of the individuals were uniquely identified in real medical data by matching several attributes with publicly available voter registration list by simple mapping operation. AOL published the search/query logs in 2006 and later withdrawn as New York Times reports were able to identify a 62 year old woman living in Lilburn (Georgia) by using her various individual specific queries (Barbaro & Zeller 2006) . Disclosure of individual's disease will have severe social consequences. Disclosure of the individual's salary information causes concern to individual's security.
One straight forward solution to protect the individual's sensitive information is not to disclose the information itself. This hinders the very purpose of the data utility involving data mining applications. The approaches of setting guidelines and policies to restrict the type of publishable data and the agreements signed on the usage and storage of sensitive data, either suffers from excessive data distortion or demands impractically high trust levels. Adversary who does not follow the rules at place is not prevented by the policies and guidelines. So, there is need of efficient PPDP schemes which provide the technical solution to the privacy protection so that it is hard for an adversary with sufficient background knowledge to infer the sensitive/private information about an individual from the published/released data. The difference between Privacy Preserving Data Mining (PPDM) and PPDP can be found in (Fung 2007 ).
Overview of Data Collection and Publishing Scenario
Privacy Preserving Data Publishing scenario includes following parties.
• Data User or Data recipient: The user who wants to utilize the data. This party conducts data mining operations on the published data. For example, researchers, data analysts etc. • Adversary: Adversary is the third party who wants to derive private information about individuals from the released/published data. Adversary tries to get the sensitive information from the published data and the background knowledge he possesses. • Data Publisher or Data Collector: A party who collects the data and wants to release the data in a way that is useful, satisfies the needs of the data users and adversary cannot infer the private information about the individuals. • Individuals or Record owners: These are the parties who submit the data to the data publisher. These individuals may trust the data publisher and give all the information requested by the data publisher. If the individuals wont trust the data publisher and wont agree the privacy policy of the data publisher, then they might not give all the requested information and hence, they make sure that the data publisher would not be able to get the sensitive information when they submit the data to data publisher.
Utility vs Privacy
In order to generate the data without sensitive information the data owner or data publisher modifies the data. The usefulness of the data is distorted by modification. There is a tradeoff between the privacy and utility. There are two extreme possibilities that a data publisher can do to release the data. Data publisher may release nothing so that privacy is perfectly preserved. In this case, no data user will be able to use the data. So, utility is zero. On the other end, data publisher may release the data without modification so that the utility is maximized but the privacy is completely lost. The following three components needs defined for any PPDP scheme (Wong & Fu 2010) .
1. Sanitization Mechanism: Given original dataset a sanitization mechanism sanitizes the dataset by making the data less precise. The dataset after sanitization process is called released candidate.
Privacy Criterion:
The privacy criterion defines whether the release candidate is safe for release or not.
3. Utility Metric: Given a released candidate, the utility metric quantifies the utility of the release candidate.
The PPDP scheme should release the most useful candidate that satisfies the defined privacy criterion.
Related Work
Privacy preserving data publishing of microdata is the research focus in the recent years. Microdata contains records each of which contains information about an individual entity, such as a person or an organization. There are various sanitization mechanisms that addresses the issue of privacy preserving while publishing the data. The common anonymization techniques are Generalization (Samarati 2001) for k− anonymity (Sweeney 2002) , Suppression, Swapping , Bucketization (Martin, Kifer, Machanavajjhala, Gehrke & Halpern 2007) (Xiao & Tao 2006) and Randomization (Chen et al. 2009 ) (Zhang, Koudas, Srivastava & Yu 2007) .
Generalization technique used for preserving privacy while publishing data loses considerable amount of information. Bucketization does not prevent membership disclosure. Moreover, Bucketization mechanism cannot be applied to the data which does not have clear separation between the quasi-identifying attributes and sensitive attributes. Suppose in swapping method if the sensitive attribute values are swapped, an individual record owner cannot identify whether his/her data is correctly published or not. Suppression and Randomization techniques suffer from loss of information. (Fung, Wang, Chen & Yu 2010 ) detailed a survey on the recent developments. (Dwork, Mcsherry, Nissim & Smith 2006) proposed a method to calibrate noise and analyzing the data. The anonymization technique k-anonymity (Sweeney 2002) anonymizes the data such that there will be information loss due to the method used to achieve the k-anonymity. In k-anonymity, only Quasi Identifiers of k tuples are made similar and the sensitive attributes are retained as in the original table. (Aggarwal 2005) proves that, when the number of attributes in quasi identifiers is high, enforcing k-anonymity necessarily results in severe information loss, even for small k. In our proposed method, we wont sanitize (alter) the original data as in k-anonymity and hence, the usefulness of the data is preserved. The queries that are run on the original data can also be run on the released data to get the same query response. So the released data remains highly useful as we show in later sections. Raymond et.al (Wong, Fu, Wang & Pei 2007) introduced minimality attack and claimed that all known mechanisms try to minimize information loss and such an attempt provides a loophole for attacks. We attempt to solve the minimality attack in our proposed scheme. As in other methods mentioned above, we wont modify the original data values.
Our Contribution
We design a novel technique for Privacy Preserving Data Publishing. The proposed technique preserves the individual privacy and the data published using the proposed sanitization mechanism represents high utility.
We introduce the notions of Semantically Secure Attribute Values and the Reputation Loss by Disclosure to hide the sensitive information of an individual/record owner in the published data. We introduce the concept of Trapdoor Attribute Values for sensitive attributes which are kept secret by the data publisher and later used by him/her to recover the original data.
We analyze the scheme with the existing attack models and show that how the released data withstands those attacks. We analyze the scheme for the preserving privacy using the existing privacy models and define our own privacy criterion and show that it meets the same. We show that the released data has higher utility using the existing utility metrics and our own defined metric.
Notations and Definitions Definition 2.1 (Original Dataset, T) The original dataset is a relational table T (A
We use |T | to denote number of tuples/rows in table T . |T | is the one data publisher wants to publish. Each row corresponds to a record owner/individual. The set of attributes {A 1 , A 2 ,... ,A n } in T are categorized into Explicit Identifiers, Quasi Identifiers and Sensitive Attributes . We define each of these categories.
Definition 2.2 (Explicit Identifiers, EI) A set EI ⊂ A is a set of attributes that uniquely and explicitly identify an individual or record owner in T . For instance, Name and Social Security Number (SSN) are the attributes that uniquely identify an individual.
Definition 2.3 (Sensitive Attributes, SA) It is the set of attributes SA ⊂ A containing personal sensitive information. For instance, salary, disease are the sensitive information specific to an individual. These attributes are not known to adversary.
Definition 2.4 (Quasi Identifiers, QID) It is the set of attributes QID ⊂ A which taken together can potentially identify an individual. For instance, Birthday, sex and Zipcode together can be used to potentially identify an individual. An adversary might already know this information. 1 , A 2 ,. .. ,A n ) be the original dataset held by the data publisher. Let S be the sanitization method applied to T . Let T ′ (A i 1 , A i 2 ,... ,A i k ) such that k < n be the output as a result of running S on T . We call T ′ the candidate dataset that a data publisher would release for public use.
Definition 2.5 (Release Candidate Data Set, T') Let T (A
We denote C A i to be the set of values of attribute A i in T . It should be noted that 
Let k be some threshold and p, q > k. We say that, a i and a j are semantically equivalent (denote it as a i s ⇔ a j ) , a i s ⇔ a j i f |F(a j ) ∩ F(a j )| ≥ k.
Definition 2.8 (Reputation Loss by Disclosure) Reputation Loss by
Disclosure is defined to be a term which tells the impact on the reputation of an individual by disclosing a sensitive information. Intuitively, we denote reputation loss for an individual as, RLoss t (a), where t ∈ T is the tuple corresponding to an individual under consideration and a is the sensitive attribute value. Our Assumptions: We make the following assumptions.
• We assume that EI ∩ QID ∩ SA = / 0. • We assume that data owner has only one sensitive value corresponding to the sensitive attribute in T and an adversary has the background knowledge as defined in Definition 2.9. We assume there is a single data publisher and the data publisher is trusted. We give an idea how to deal with untrusted data publisher.
Details of Proposed scheme
In this section, we detail our proposed PPDP scheme. Let T (A 1 ,... ,A (A u+1 ,... ,A n ) ;
is the set of Trap Door Attribute Values corresponding to the sensitive attribute A v+1 . For all the sensitive attributes a set is defined and initially these sets are empty.;
Initialize X = / 0 ; 6 foreach A i ∈ SA do // The following step chooses the trapdoor attributes values which are semantically equivalent and with less reputation loss compared to the attribute value under consideration.; of the sensitive attributes of the original dataset are preserved. So the utility of the released data is high without any information loss. The query response for the queries on the released data involving sensitive attributes values (except trapdoor attribute values) as the condition value in the where clause are preserved. All the queries involving values of the original table are also preserved.
Proposed Scheme's Resistance to Attacks
We provide the details of few of the existing attack models (Fung, Wang, Chen & Yu 2010) and explain how our proposed scheme withstands/counters the attacks.
• Record Linkage Attack: Since our scheme is 2-anonymous the record linkage attack is not possible. • Attribute Linkage Attack or Homogeneity Attack: Here, attacker is assumed to have known some unique characteristics of target individual. In the developed scheme, unique characteristics are not present hence combinatorial attack is not possible. (Fung, Wang, Chen & Yu 2010) , then the attacker could still confidently infer the sub range in a group. In the developed scheme guessing probability is reduced by 50%. (Fung, Wang, Fu, & Yu 2010) . In other words, QID ′ is covered by QID, so QID ′ can be removed from the privacy requirement. In some scenarios, data miner may ask to retain actual values of quasi identifiers for analysis. So those values can not be generalized and suppressed leading to privacy problems. In the developed scheme, as we are considering entire set of quasi and non sensitive attributes, all other subsets of QID can be omitted from privacy requirement. All quasi identifier values are retained for data analysis. • l-diversity: The l-diversity requires every qid group to contain at least l "well-represented" sensitive values (Fung, Wang, Chen & Yu 2010) . The proposed scheme achieves 2 diversity. This prevents the attribute linkage.
Proposed Privacy Criterion and
Claim 1 (Our Privacy Criterion) Let T (A 1 ,... ,A n ) be the original dataset and T ′ (A i 1 ,...,A i k ) such that k < n be the released candidate data as a result of applying Algorithm 1 to T . W.l.o.g, we consider sensitive attribute set to be SA = {A i k } and QID = {A i 1 ,... ,A i k−1 }. Let t 1 = {a i 1 , a i 2 ,... ,a i k } and t 2 = {a i 1 , a i 2 ,...,a i k−1 , b i k } be the two tuples in T ′ such that a i k s ⇔ b i k and RLoss(b i k ) < RLoss(a i k ). Let A be an adversary with the Adversarial Background Knowledge α as in Definition 2.9. Then, the probability that A will be able to derive the sensitive information and disclose identity of the individual is ≤ 1/2.
Proof 1 A with the background knowledge α may try to join an external table X that contains α and the identity of an individual with the released candidate T ′ . Then for each individual with a given QID values there will be two records in the join result. So, A has to make choice between two sensitive values to disclose the individual's sensitive information. So this probability is ≤ 1/2. Less is because there might be other tuples in T ′ with similar QID values.
It means that there will be more than 2 tuples with similar QID values and with different sensitive attribute values. So the probability with which an individual's personal sensitive information is disclosed will be strictly less than 1/2.
Conclusion and Future Work
We have designed a new Privacy Preserving Data Publishing using the method of record addition with semantically equivalent sensitive attribute values and the attribute values with lesser reputation loss by disclosure. We have defined the privacy criterion and the utility metric and assessed the released data with the existing utility metrics. It is shown that the proposed sanitization method preserves privacy according to the defined notion and has high utility. The data publisher will be able to recover the original data from the released data using secret trapdoor sensitive attribute values. An adversary with the defined background knowledge will not be able to identify and link the sensitive value to an individual. The proposed method preserves privacy and the utility is high compared to the general anonymization techniques including k-anonymity. As a future work, careful analysis of the original dataset is required to reduce the number of tuples in the released dataset.
